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Abstract
Prior to its historic 2015 “no hack” pact for commercial advantage with
the United States, Beijing has been engaged drafting and passing
legislation, most with specific cyber components, to enhance its security
posture while protecting its economic interests. This approach is in stark
contrast to United States efforts that have demonstrated a focus on
“acting globally, thinking locally” philosophy wherein most of its cyber
efforts have been outwardly facing and are distinct from other security
considerations. This paper suggests that by strengthening its domestic
front with a legal framework, Beijing is preparing itself to counter any
foreign initiative contrary to Beijing’s plans (e.g., cyber norms of
behavior, cyber sanctions, etc.) by being able to exert legal measures
against foreign interests in country, thereby preserving its cyber
sovereignty.
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Introduction 
During the period where the United States threatened to impose cyber 
sanctions against China for suspected industrial espionage, Beijing has been 
busy drafting and passing internal legislation to enhance its security posture 
while protecting its economic interests.  Many critics of this series of draft 
legislation, particular its draft Cybersecurity Law, believe that China is 
seeking to increase its control over domestic Internet activity and the 
information traversing it, or using its strict mandates to protect Chinese 
businesses from foreign competition.  One interpretation of the aggressive 
initiatives undertaken by Beijing is that they reflect an “acting locally, 
thinking globally” approach to China’s security situation, intentionally 
integrating cybersecurity into all facets of its national strategy.  The result is 
that Beijing is guaranteeing its self-described right of cyber sovereignty, a 
term that remains contested in the international community.  Internet 
security is a national priority due to its interconnected nature with China’s 
informatization strategy, the national-level plan to modernize all facets of 
China’s society.  Indeed, the comprehensive nature of China’s recently 
enacted National Security law suggests that Beijing is positioning itself for 
greater resiliency in the face of exterior influence and pressure in an attempt 
to mitigate and lessen potential economic and/or diplomatic liabilities 
imposed by the West. 
 
Definitions 
For the purpose of this article, the following definitions are applied. 
 
Cyber sovereignty.  In December 2015, Xi Jinping referred a nation’s right to 
choose how to develop and regulate their Internet.1  In this vein, cyber 
sovereignty reflects the stance that cyberspace should be defined and ruled by 
state boundaries.2 
 
Cyberspace.  The environment formed by physical and nonphysical 
components, characterized by the use of computers and the electro-magnetic 
spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data using computer networks.3  
                                                        
1 “China Internet: Xi Jinping Calls for Cyber Sovereignty,” BBC News, December 16, 2015, 
available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35109453. 
2 John Costello and Peter Mattis, “Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese 
Information Operations,” China’s Evolving Military Strategy (Washington, DC: April 
2016). 
3 The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, March 28, 
2013, available at: 
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Information security.  China does not use the word cyber and prefers the 
term information security as it includes the mental aspects of information as 
well as the technology on which it is processed and shared.4  
 
China and Information Security 
The fundamental difference between how China and the United States view 
cyberspace is clear in their respective interpretations on what constitutes 
cyber security.  While the United States maintains a technological view of 
cyberspace, China is more holistic in its perception taking into account not 
only the technology that facilitates communications, but also the actual data 
that traverses or is stored on it.5  This all-inclusive perception is essential in 
understanding how China approaches its own security.  In February 2014, 
Chinese President Xi Jinping said that there was no national security without 
cyber security.6  The fact that the two have mutual reliance not only highlights 
China’s understanding of the connective nature of networks, but that equally, 
if not more important, that data and information are the true drivers for 
creating a secure environment.   
 
Rarely do actors exploit networks for its own sake (although in times of 
conflict networks may be the targets for disruption or destruction); rather, as 
the volume of global cyber espionage activity suggests it is the information the 
network possesses that is valuable, whether it is to a country, a foreign 
government, or non-state actors.  Indeed, China is well aware of the influence 
potential that information can have, particularly about inciting dissent in a 
country.  China’s leaders saw the Color Revolutions as illegitimate actions that 
removed standing powers, significantly helped by raging domestic grievances, 
electoral politics exploited by the opposition, and Western powers’ 
intervention for geo-strategic interest.7  The Chinese government sees its 
role as a holistic enabler supporting the protection and development of 
                                                        
https://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinnmanual?layout=http://skin.issuu.com/v/
light/layout.xml&showFlipBtn=true&e=5903855/1802381. 
4 Keir Giles and William Hagestad, “Divided by a Common Language: Cyber Definitions 
in Chinese, English, and Russian,” 2013 5th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 
available at: https://ccdcoe.org/publications/2013proceedings/d3r1s1_giles.pdf. 
5 Ibid.  
6 “President Xi Jinping’s Views on the Internet,” China Daily, December 14, 2015, 
available at: http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-
12/14/content_22706983_3.htm. 
7 Titus C. Chen, “China’s Reaction to the Colored Revolutions: Adaptive Authoritarianism 
in Full Swing,” National Chengchi University (NCCU)–Institute of International 
Relations, 2010, available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1644372. 
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economic and social initiatives through its series of strategic national Five 
Year Plans.  Due to important part that cyberspace—both the technology 
as well as the information traversing it—plays in driving economic 
prosperity and promoting social harmony, it’s easy to see why China 
believes that focusing solely on the infrastructure is too limiting, and does 
not take into account a country’s security and development as well as its 
people’s life and work.”8  Therefore, without willing to make concessions, it 
comes as little surprise that the two governments have thus far failed to make 
significant progress in trying to establish norms of behavior in cyberspace, or 
come to consensus on what constitutes cybersecurity.  A mid-September 2015 
meeting between Chinese and U.S. officials made headway on this issue, but 
as of this writing, there remains a fundamental area of disagreement on some 
important tenets. 
 
Similar to other governments, the issue of cybersecurity has become a major 
concern for Beijing that has resulted in new agencies being created as well as 
new legislation being put forth in order to consolidate cybersecurity efforts.  
This is a vital national imperative for China, a fact evidenced by ever-
increasing efforts to control information in country.  While trying to increase 
indigenous production of information technology to reduce reliance on 
foreign products, China maintains two objectives whose missions ultimately 
serve the same purpose: preserving the Chinese Communist Party in power. 
 
Key Government Security Initiatives with Cyber Implications 
China co-sponsored two proposals for an international code of conduct for 
nation state use of information and telecommunication technologies–the first 
presented before the United Nations in 2011, and a revised version in 2015—
that have essentially made little headway.9  In both, China appears to have 
focused on information security-related initiatives whose outcomes it can 
control and that directly support China’s interests domestically.  One of the 
                                                        
8 William Wan, “Chinese President Xi Jinping Takes Charge of New Cyber Effort,” The 
Washington Post, February 27, 2014, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-president-takes-charge-of-new-
cyber-effort/2014/02/27/a4bffaac-9fc9-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html. 
9 Letter dated September 12, 2011 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the 
Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General, A//66/359/, September 9, 2011, available at: 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-110912-CodeOfConduct_0.pdf; 
Letter dated January 9, 2015 from the Permanent Representatives of China, the Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the 
Secretary-General, A//69/723/, January 13, 2015, available at: 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/UN-150113-CodeOfConduct.pdf. 
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first key initiatives instituted was the 2014 establishment of a Xi Jinping-led 
national-level Internet security-leading group to provide critical policy 
guidance for Internet-related activities in China. 
 
The second initiative is a series of legislation each focusing on areas of 
national security concerns, each composed of Information security 
components.  Critics view much of this new legislation as China exerting 
protectionism in order to deter competition while promoting its own 
companies.  However, when viewed through a holistic security prism, the two 
are not mutually exclusive and if economic development is a Chinese national 
priority, ensuring that those companies viewed as integral to supporting or 
driving the country’s economic progress is a national security priority, and 
will likely be supported by government activities. 10 During his September 
2015 to the United States, Xi Jinping commented, “We will continue to build 
a law-based business environment” emphasizing an almost quid-pro-quo 
relationship.  China will continue to open up its marketplace as long as the 
United States reduces its limits on what American companies can sell in 
China as well as a “level playing field” for Chinese investment in the United 
States.11   
 
China’s recently drafted legislation covers a diverse spectrum of economic and 
security concerns to include national security, non-governmental 
organizations, anti-terrorism, and cyber security.  However, it is noteworthy 
that technology and its proper use was a component in much of this 
legislation, establishing a baseline and providing China a legal means to 
identify and mitigate any behavior outside what it deems acceptable.  
Alternatively, it reaffirms China’s right to dictate the regulation of its 
cyberspace and provides China the legal justification to do so.  Not only does 
this reaffirm Xi’s acknowledgement that without cybersecurity there is no 
national security, but with the inclusion of such mandates Beijing is subtly 
guaranteeing its rights for cyber sovereignty, a term that it first introduced in 
its 2010 white article, “The Internet in China.”12 
                                                        
10 Eswar Prasad, “China’s Approach to Economic Development and Industrial Policy,” 
Brookings Institution, June 15, 2011, available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2011/06/15-china-economic-
development-prasad.  
11 Todd C. Frankel, “China’s President Promises to Open Doors to U.S. Businesses,” The 
Washington Post, September 23, 2015, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/china-president-pledges-to-
open-doors-to-us-businesses/2015/09/23/298d24e0-94d6-4064-930a-
b21578916b8d_story.html. 
12 Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s Sovereign Internet,” The Diplomat, June 24, 2014, available 
at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/chinas-sovereign-internet/. 
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Creation of the Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading 
Group  
While the Chinese government bureaucratic hierarchy resembles that of other 
governments, leading small groups composed of senior influential officials 
drive important policy decisions.  Leading groups, which rarely announce 
their meetings or disclose their full membership, cover everything from 
economics to propaganda working out policy decisions long before the party 
receives them.13 According to the director of a Chinese policy institute, small 
groups rather than government ministries decide important policy matters.14 
 
In February 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping assumed charge of a new 
Central Committee leading group overseeing Chinese Internet security, the 
Central Internet Security and Informatization Leading Group.  State-run 
CCTV outlined several goals of the group, including the drafting of a 
comprehensive national cybersecurity strategy and coordination of 
cybersecurity across sectors.  According to CCTV, Xi tied the importance of 
government work on securing the Internet to long-term priorities, such as 
maintaining control over public opinion in China.15 
 
Additionally, according to Chinese news sources, this leading group is to 
deepen reform, protect national security, safeguard national interests, and 
promote the development of information technology. The group will have 
complete authority over online activities, including economic, political, 
cultural, social, and military. 16 The leading group’s close relationship to 
China’s State Council, the chief administrative authority of the country, 
enables rapid implementation of guidelines and laws.17 
 
                                                        
13 Cary Huang, “How Leading Small Groups Help Xi Jinping and other Party Leaders 
Exert Power,” South China Morning Post, September 14, 2014, available at: 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1409118/how-leading-small-groups-help-
xi-jinping-and-other-party-leaders-exert.  
14 Ibid.  
15 William Wan, “Chinese President Xi Jinping Takes Charge of New Cyber Effort,” The 
Washington Post, February 27, 2014, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chinese-president-takes-charge-of-new-
cyber-effort/2014/02/27/a4bffaac-9fc9-11e3-b8d8-94577ff66b28_story.html. 
16 “Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatization Established,” China 
Copyright and Media, March 13, 2014, available at: 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/03/01/central-leading-group-
for-internet-security-and-informatization-established/.  
17 “China Monitor,” Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 2014, available at: 
http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/China-
Monitor/China_Monitor_No_20_eng.pdf. 
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The leading group’s membership demonstrates China’s commitment in 
raising cybersecurity to the national level, providing a decision-making 
authority.  The senior-level membership to include the President and the 
Premier reflect Beijing’s direct involvement in the creation and 
implementation of future cyber policy for the country.  Indeed, China 
designed its “Outline of National IT Development Strategy” to guide the 
country’s IT development for the next decade and position China to become 
an Internet power by 2050. 18 
 
 
Passing the 2016 “Cyber Security” Law 
In November 2016, the Chinese government approved its “Cyber Security” 
Law, which addresses the security of key Internet and information systems 
and data,19 as well as increasing the government’s powers to record and 
impede the dissemination of information it deemed illegal.20  Introduced by 
the Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC), an organization created in 
2014 to consolidate control over cybersecurity, the law is set to go into effect 
in June 2017.21  Per the law, government agencies would issue additional 
guidelines for network security in "critical industries" such as telecoms, 
energy, transport, finance, national defense and military matters, and 
government administration, according to a news source.22  Agencies and 
enterprises will be compelled to improve their ability to defend against 
network intrusions while demanding security reviews for equipment and 
data.23  The government will adopt priority protection over key information 
infrastructure that seriously jeopardizes national security and the public 
                                                        
18 “China Eyes World Class Cyber Multi-Nationals,” Xinhua, July 27, 2016, available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/27/c_135544563.htm; Mandy Zuo, “China 
Aims to Become Internet Superpower by 2050,” South China Morning Post, July 28, 
2016, available at: http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-
politics/article/1995936/china-aims-become-internet-cyberpower-2020. 
19 “China Passes New National Security Law Extending Control over the Internet,” The 
Guardian, July 1, 2015, available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/01/china-national-security-law-
internet-regulation-cyberspace-xi-jinping.   
20 Gerry Shih, “China Draft Cyber Security Law Could up Censorship, Irk Business,” 
Reuters, July 8, 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/us-
china-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0PI09020150708. 
21 Josh Chin and Eva Dou, “China’s New Cybersecurity Law Rattles Foreign Tech Firms,” 
Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2016 available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-approves-cybersecurity-law-1478491064. 
22 Gerry Shih, “China Draft Cyber Security Law Could up Censorship, Irk Business,” 
Reuters, July 8, 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/08/us-
china-cybersecurity-idUSKCN0PI09020150708. 
23 Chin and Dou, “China’s New Cybersecurity Law.”  
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interest, particularly in the event of damaged or leaked data.24  According to 
one Chinese media outlet, the law safeguards sovereignty on cyberspace, 
national security, and the rights of citizens.25 
 
Internationally, the law faces much trepidation.  Critics believe that such a bill 
would further protect China products, conveying that such legislation could 
make it difficult for countries that rely on competition to bolster their 
economic interests.26  Other critics cite the provisions of making censorship a 
matter of cybersecurity, which ultimately would allow the government to 
punish those companies that allow unapproved online publication of 
information online.27  Certainly, the fact that the law requires information 
produced in China to remain in China can make it difficult for foreign 
vendors, particularly of tech equipment, considering that all network 
equipment must meet Chinese government approval prior to deployment.28  
However, some see the law as bolstering the security of the domestic 
population.  As one source points out, most of the privacy enhancements 
benefiting Chinese citizens (to include access, data retention, breach 
notification, mobile privacy, online fraud, and protection of minors) align 
with those required in the European Union.29   
 
The urgency of this law reflects Beijing’s prioritization of the use of the 
Internet particularly as it applies to its national security, which may be the 
reason why many of the same issues feature prominently in both the national 
security law and the new cybersecurity law.  There are two key reoccurring 
themes: 1) the ability to monitor and control information, and 2) the 
compliance of foreign enterprises with the rules set forth.  Both have been 
cited by critics as being efforts of the government to tighten its control on civil 
                                                        
24 “Second Reading of China’s Draft of Cybersecurity Law,” Lexology, June 30, 2016, 
available at: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=eaac6bbd-12ab-4459-
96cd-ba42a2cee007. 
25 “Xinhua Insight: China adopts cybersecurity law to protect national security, citizens' 
rights,” Xinhua.net, November 7, 2016, available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-11/07/c_135812209.htm. 
26 Katie Nelson, “China’s Cybersecurity Law–Trouble for Businesses,” The Washington 
Examiner, September 8, 2015, available at: 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-trouble-for-
businesses/article/2571314. 
27 Chin and Dou, “China’s New Cybersecurity Law.” 
28 Jonathan Vanian, “How China’s Proposed Cybersecurity Law Could Impact Tech 
Companies,” Fortune, July 8, 2015, available at: http://fortune.com/2015/07/08/chinas-
proposed-cybersecurity-law-impact-tech-companies/. 
29 Patrick Burke, “China: Carpe Datum Law Blog China Finalizes Cyber Security Law,” 
Mondaq, December 8, 2016, available at: 
http://www.mondaq.com/china/x/551194/Security/Carpe+Datum+Law+Blog+China
+Finalizes+New+Cyber+Security+Law. 
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society while making unreasonable demands on foreign businesses,30 
particularly as it empowers the government to oversee the hardware and 
software holding the data of foreign companies, as well as look inside at the 
data.31  On December 27, CAC published a strategy document that laid out the 
framework for the new cybersecurity law in which it reiterated the need for 
increased scrutiny of local and foreign technology used in industries deemed 
critical to the national interest.32  While such a mandate may appear 
draconian, it does align China’s strategic security interests with most other 
nation states, particularly concerning security critical infrastructure. 
 
However, perhaps creating the most uneasiness is the vagueness surrounding 
the language of the law and the details surrounding how the government 
intends to monitor compliance, leaving such interpretation up to the 
authorities in charge.  Such broad considerations enable China to implement 
a case-by-case approach, allowing it to scrutinize the business practices of the 
companies, as well as any perceived or real government association, to 
influence and inform decision-making.  In such instances, such legal 
ambiguity provides China the means to implement penalties as a warning or a 
retaliatory action to perceived threats against Chinese economic and/or 
political interests. 
 
Passing the 2016 Overseas Non-Government Organization Management 
Law 
The law is designed to standardize foreign non-governmental office (NGO) 
operations in order to promote “exchange and cooperation” while outlining 
permissible and non-permissible activities.33  All NGOs would be required to 
get approval from a Chinese supervisory unit before it can operate in China, 
banning those that do not receive such authorization.34  It further prohibits 
any Chinese organization from conducting activities on behalf of or with non-
                                                        
30 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “The Chilling Effect of China’s New Cybersecurity Regime, 
Foreign Policy, July 10, 2015, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/china-
new-cybersecurity-law-internet-security/. 
31 Burke, “China: Carpe Datum Law.”  
32 Cate Cadell, “China Renews Calls for Tighter Cyber Space Security – CAC,” Reuters, 
December 27, 2016, available at: http://news.trust.org/item/20161227071926-di2or/.  
33 Jared Genser and Julia Kuperminc, “China’s Proposed Non-Governmental 
Organization Law: Cooperation or Coercion?” The Diplomat, July 2, 2015, available at: 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/chinas-proposed-non-governmental-organization-
law-cooperation-or-coercion/. 
34 Edward Wong, “Clampdown in China Restricts 7,000 Foreign Organizations,” The New 
York Times, April 28, 2016, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/world/asia/china-foreign-ngo-law.html. 
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authorized NGOs.35  Critics are pressing Beijing to revise the current draft due 
to concerns that the law would greatly influence Chinese civil society, 
restricting freedoms, and tightening control of expression within China.36 
Like the National Security and draft Cybersecurity law, the NGO law is 
nebulous concerning definitions affording Beijing considerable grey area in 
which to operate.  For example, identifying criteria for what constitutes an 
NGO is unclear and possibly ranges from a foreign professor visiting China to 
an artistic dance troupe.37  Additionally worrisome is that the law forbids 
political activities without clarifying activity classification or providing the 
evaluation criteria informing this determination.38  While the law is not 
specifically cyber-related, it is safe to assume that NGOs that properly register 
with Chinese authorities would be required to comply with any acceptable 
technology use policies set forth by the Chinese government in other 
legislation.   
 
Passing the 2015 National Security Law 
On July 1, 2015, China’s Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress adopted a new National Security Law, largely considered China’s 
most comprehensive national security legislation.  According to one U.S. law 
firm specializing in international national security matters, the main function 
of the law is to provide a framework for China’s security considerations in the 
face of emerging threats; however, overlapping security considerations in 
many areas demonstrate Beijing’s perspective that national security is an 
inherently integrated process, creating “a national security path with Chinese 
characteristics.”39  The law breaks down into the following seven chapters: 
 
• Guiding principles for national security 
• Defining national security across multiple areas (e.g., cultural, 
economic, and military security) 
                                                        
35 “China: The Draft Overseas NGO Management Law Must be Substantially Revised,” 
FIDH, June 3, 2015, available at: https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-
Human-Rights/asia/china/china-the-draft-overseas-ngo-management-law-must-be-
substantially. 
36 Sui-Lee Wee, Michael Martina, and James Pomfret, “Foreign Governments, Non-
Profits Press China to Revise NGO Law,” Reuters, June 1, 2015, available at: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/01/us-china-ngos-
idUSKBN0OH2I720150601. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Genser and Kuperminc, “China’s Proposed Non-Governmental Organization Law.” 
39 Zunou Zhou, “China’s Draft Counter-Terrorism Law,” Jamestown Foundation, July 17, 
2015, available at: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=44173
&cHash=dc00eedd4c61b21c691b9700b1468049#.VfwKd3szAZQ. 
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• Functions and responsibilities of the National People’s Congress 
• Key elements of the national security regime (e.g., intelligence 
collection, states of emergency) 
• Allocating resources to national security work 
• Obligations of citizens and corporations to national security 
• Supplementary provisions40 
 
Perhaps most notably, however, is that the law is not restrictive to China’s 
borders.  Included in China’s territorial sovereignty includes the polar beds, 
outer space, and cyberspace, a much wider aperture than narrower 
perspectives on national security that focus more on defense.41  This should 
come as little surprise given Beijing’s continued advocacy for a state’s right of 
territorial sovereignty, particularly in areas such as cyberspace and outer 
space.  With cyberspace, China views information as well as information 
systems in the same context, intimating that information even outside China’s 
borders is a potential threat to its national security interests. 42    
 
Critics of the new law cite two major concerns about the legislation’s wording 
and implication.  The first is that the law is widely seen as Beijing’s 
commitment to increasing its monitoring and control of internal dissent, 
while government officials view it as a necessary tool to address new and 
emerging threats such as cybercrime and terrorism.43  Many believe that 
China cracks down on opposition, a capability greatly enhanced by the broad 
powers imparted to authorities under the current wording of the new law.  
One major criticism is that the stated provisions are vague, lacking the 
necessary details to provide a more concrete understanding of what is 
acceptable and where the line is drawn and what are acceptable 
repercussions.  Such ambiguity appears left up to the discretion and 
interpretation of authorities providing them a wide berth from which to 
operate. 
                                                        
40 “China Enacts New National Security Law,” Covington, July 2, 2015, available at: 
https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/publications/2015/06/china_passes_n
ew_national_security_law.pdf. 
41 “China’s New National Security Law Creates More Insecurity for Foreign Businesses,” 
Hogan Lovells, July 2015, available at: 
https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/chinas-new-national-security-law-
creates-more-insecurity-for-foreign-businesses. 
42 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “The Chilling Effect of China’s New Cybersecurity Regime, 
Foreign Policy, July 10, 2015, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/china-
new-cybersecurity-law-internet-security/. 
43 Chun Han Wong, “China Adopts Sweeping National-Security Law,” The Wall Street 
Journal, July 1, 2015, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-adopts-
sweeping-national-security-law-1435757589. 
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The second concern is that the law’s focus on foreign technology products and 
services is a move to promote Chinese companies over foreign competitors.  
Core network technology, critical infrastructure, and information systems and 
data in key areas are to be stored securely and be controllable.44  
Unsurprisingly, this is garnering much concern from foreign companies that 
would fall under these requirements under Article 59, which focuses on 
national security review and monitoring “foreign investment that infringes 
upon or may infringe upon national security.”45  This may result in serious 
implications for foreign suppliers of such equipment and/or services, such as 
the imposition of higher costs or scrutiny than their Chinese counterparts. 
 
If the national security law is the foundation from which its subsequent draft 
legislation has emerged, China’s May 2015 Military Strategy is the 
underpinning for many of these sovereignty themes.  The strategy emphasizes 
China’s national security situation against a world of complex threats, taking 
the opportunity to address specifically space and cyberspace as the new 
commanding heights in strategic competition.46  Indeed, China’s national 
level policy reinforces messaging that addresses China’s peaceful rise in a 
time of increasing and diverse threats making integrated security planning an 
essential counterweight. 
 
Passing the 2015 Anti-Terror Law 
In December 2015, China passed a new “anti-terror law” that compels 
technology companies to help decrypt information giving Chinese authorities 
access to encrypted data.47 The law combined administrative, judicial, and 
military means to address Chinese anti-terrorism efforts, demonstrating a 
comprehensiveness that reflects Beijing’s desire to integrate all facets of 
security under the umbrella of its new national security law.  The law 
reinforces tenets seen in the other draft legislation: aspects of information 
control, organizational monitoring, technology compliance, and collaboration 
with Chinese authorities in the name of security.  For example, the proposed 
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law would also require companies to keep also servers and user data 
within China, supply law enforcement authorities with communications 
records and censor terrorism-related Internet content.48  In the face of 
mounting pressure, China ultimately amended some of the initial provisions 
that would have mandated technology companies to provide backdoor access 
for Chinese authorities’ remote access.  Ultimately, the final enacted law did 
not include these provisions.49 
 
Developing and Using IT Standards 
While China pushes forward its legislative agenda, it also approaches its 
security from technological perspective where it continually seeks ways to 
reduce dependence on foreign technologies.  One approach toward this end is 
the development of alternative standards to help boost their own companies.  
National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower Edward Snowden’s disclosures 
of alleged collusion between U.S. technology firms and the NSA only 
magnified China’s fears of foreign technology resulting in China removing 
some U.S. companies from government-approved purchase lists.50  The 
following are some initiatives that China has embarked upon to reach this 
objective. 
 
• China’s Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS): First introduced in 
2007, China’s MLPS protects Chinese national security, although 
detractors believe it also serves to protect Chinese industry from 
international competition.51  The MLPS has a five-level risk-based 
classification to identify and protect those systems that are critical for 
national security and the economy (Level 3 and above).52  In concert 
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with the MLPS strategy, China has ventured forth in trying to develop 
alternative standards to compete with Western-led standardization 
efforts.  Some of these include: 
 
• WAPI: China was working to adopt Wireless LAN 
Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) as a 
mandatory security measure for any wireless product sold in 
China.  However, after objections from the U.S. government 
and other IT companies, it suspended efforts in 2014.53 
 
• Payments Standard: Additionally, in June 2015, China 
implemented a payments standard requiring all bank cards 
issued in China to comply with a technical standard known as 
PBOC 3.0.  The new standard would force companies like 
MasterCard and Visa to adopt the new standard at a significant 
cost.  While cited as a security concern, detractors assert that 
China is using this standard as an “unnecessary barrier to 
trade.”54 
 
Legal Warfare–Prepping for Future Conflict 
Viewed through the prism of legal warfare, the onslaught of draft legislation 
bolsters China’s strategy to exploit domestic and international laws in order to 
achieve the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests.55  At its core, before 
the onset of actual formal hostilities and continuing after their conclusion, the 
strategic goal of legal warfare provides pre-conflict justification and post-
conflict legal resolution.56   
 
Passed legislation focuses on areas that not only improve Chinese security, 
but also provide the legal justification for Chinese authorities to act in any 
manner they determine is appropriate.  The ambiguity inherent in each draft 
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bill allows operational freedom for the government allowing it to determine 
criminal acts and corresponding consequences to their offenses. 
 
When viewing requirements placed on foreign interests in China, failure to 
comply provides the government a legal avenue to pursue repercussions.  The 
legal nebulousness provides China the wiggle room to pursue other means of 
resolution to safeguard its interests in other political, diplomatic, or economic 
areas.  For example, should the United States ultimately levy cyber sanctions 
against China for their espionage activities, China is able to look at U.S. 
companies in China and find the legal means with which to impose fines or 
expel them from business from China as a retaliatory action that is backed by 
the legal grounds the government has established.  The fact that businesses 
have to agree to these rules in order to do business in China means that they 
acknowledged and understood the laws previously giving them little recourse 
to appealing the matter. 
 
Acting Locally–What Does It Mean for China? 
By acting locally about implementing cybersecurity in all of its legislation, 
China is legally guaranteeing its rights as a cyber sovereign, thereby providing 
the justification to mitigate direct threats to its national security via the 
information space.  The fact that Beijing views its national security as a closely 
interwoven tapestry of concerns with information security as its unifying 
thread suggests that it will continue to view “cyber” security from a holistic 
perspective, and not just a technical one and not just a technical one 
disconnected from the data it protects.  Overlapping rules ultimately offer the 
government plenty of opportunities to target individuals/organizations under 
various statutes, thereby providing it a diverse and flexible platform from 
which to respond to any perceived hostile infractions to China’s information 
space.  They also offer Beijing a retaliatory mechanism for incurred penalties 
like cyber sanctions that levied against Chinese interests. 
 
Termed “protectionist” by critics, these legislative initiatives accomplish the 
goal of strengthening China’s strategic security interests (which include 
regime power continuity, sustaining economic growth, domestic stability, 
defending national and territorial sovereignty, and reacquiring regional 
preeminence).57  Therefore, when governments admonish Beijing for 
                                                        
57 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015,” 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at: 
http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Re
port.pdf. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 10, No. 1
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol10/iss1/2
DOI: http://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.10.1.1548
 15 
 
supporting its commercial sector via government requirements that restrain 
foreign businesses in country, Beijing can leverage these laws to support these 
same national security interests.  The same principle extends to conducting 
cyber espionage for intellectual property for that matter, as long as it does not 
conflict with the principles set forth in the 2015 China-U.S. “no hacking for 
commercial gain” agreement. 
 
“Acting locally” via recent legislation enables China to address better its 
strategic security objectives by positioning China to be able to mitigate 
potential fallout from those situations that could negatively affect China’s 
interests.  Some of these include but are not limited to the following:   
 
• A Chinese Color Revolution: Beijing is acutely aware of the successes 
the various Color Revolutions had on regime change in their respective 
countries.  Beijing has survived similar scares in the past: The 1989 
Tiananmen Square student-led protests called for press and speech 
freedoms.  The protests culminated in a million people gathering at its 
height and required military intervention to quell it.58  In 2014, 
authorities ultimately put down Hong Kong’s pro-democratic “Occupy 
Central” protesters after two months of protesting.59  Monitoring and 
controlling information venues, as well as any NGO in country, 
certainly mitigates the opportunities for harmful information to work 
its way into the public domain. 
 
• Non-China Friendly Cyber Norms of Behavior: While there is not a 
currently an accepted international cyber, code of conduct, both the 
United States and China and Russia have been promoting their own 
visions of what such an agreement should encompass. Should the 
global consensus favor the model advocated by the United States and 
Western interests, Beijing can enforce the standards set forth by this 
series of legislation as they dictate the rule of conduct for organizations 
in its sovereign territory. 
 
Conclusion 
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China’s new legislation comes at a time when Beijing is actively seeking to 
improve its security posture, while concurrently trying to preserve its vital 
interests, particularly an economy which had experienced substantial growth 
but has since slowed down considerably in 2015.60  The series of draft 
legislation focuses internally and in several cases contain overlapping 
regulations designed to enforce the same rules.  Vague language and lack of 
clear criteria will ultimately benefit the Chinese who will be able to use their 
own judgment in reviewing potential infractions on a case-by-case basis, 
allowing them to levy punishment per their assignment of value (and perhaps 
influenced by geopolitical matters). 
 
China’s belief that information security integrates with other security 
disciplines demonstrates its commitment to addressing its acknowledged 
weaknesses in the digital domain.  The establishment of a national-level 
leading group whose mission is to protect national security, safeguard 
national interests, and promote the development of information technology, 
underscores this undertaking.61  The close relationship with the leading group 
and the State Council further shows that such collaboration better ensures the 
rapid implementation of guidelines and laws. 62  The onslaught of draft 
legislation and the prompt enactment of its new National Security Law are 
indicative of the success of this collaboration. 
 
It is too early to tell if China will push the seemingly restrictive parameters of 
their recent legislation drafts, are temper them more in order to assuage 
foreign concerns.  The result of Xi’s 2015 state visit and political/economic 
responses to alleged Chinese cyber activity, as well as other geopolitical 
hotspots such as South China Sea disputes will likely influence the ultimate 
verbiage, passage, and enforcement of these laws.  Based on previous history, 
Beijing will likely wait, watch, and act accordingly.  
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